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FUNERAL HOME FIELD ADVANTAGE: How PENNSYLVANIA
FUNERAL DIRECTORS SCORED A VICTORY WITH THE THIRD
CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN HEFFNER V. MURPHY
Michael Begovic
I. INTRODUCTION

Benjamin Franklin famously said there are two things certain in life:
death and taxes. 1 However, the laws that govern how we dispose of,
commemorate, and memorialize the dead are anything but certain.
Regulations governing the funeral home industry are no exception. Not
even Benjamin Franklin could have envisioned the number of
burdensome and protectionist regulations governing who can own and
operate funeral homes now on the books. Originally passed and
implemented to protect the health, safety, and well-being of the
industry, 2 funeral home regulations have far overstepped that goal, and
now serve as a mechanism to shield local practitioners from outside
competition. 3 This Casenote will look at some of those regulations.
Specifically, the focus will be on the regulatory scheme enacted and
implemented by the Pennsylvania General Assembly.
Part II of this Casenote sets the backdrop by providing a brief
overview of regulations governing the funeral home industry and
looking at how courts have handled constitutional challenges to some of
these regulations. Part II also describes the regulatory scheme enacted
by the Pennsylvania General Assembly and the measures the legislative
body subsequently took to reexamine the scheme in light of growing
criticism. Part III focuses on the Third Circuit's decision in Heffner v.
Murphy upholding most of Pennsylvania's controversial funeral home
regulations. The analysis of the case will hone in on two key provisions
and how they were viewed under the Commerce Clause. Finally, Part
IV will argue that the Third Circuit's approach was flawed because it

(1789),
Leroy
to
Jean-Baptiste
Franklin
Benjamin
1. Letter
from
www.someworthwhilequotes.com/certaintychange.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
2. Tanya D. Marsh, Rethinking the Law of the Dead, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1327, 1329-31

(2013).
3. Lana Harfoush, Grave Consequences for Economic Liberty: The Funeral Industry's
Protectionist Occupation Licensing Scheme, the Circuit Split, and Why it Matters, 5 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHp & L. 135, 136 (2011).
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awarded excessive deference to the legislature and placed too much
weight on the neutral language of the law. Additionally, Part IV will

explore the economic arguments surrounding Pennsylvania's regulatory
scheme and other regulations of this type within the funeral home
industry and will discuss how the Heffner ruling may affect future trends
within the funeral home industry.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Licensing in General

Like many other professional industries, the funeral home industry
has experienced a growing number of licensing regulations. 4 In this
sense, the funeral home industry is a microcosm of a larger trend: the

number of licensing regulations permeating all professions is continuing
to increase. 5 Licensing boards, comprised of market veterans, usually
pass and enforce these regulations. 6 Herein lies the conflict of interest:

many licensing boards have a strong incentive to limit price competition
and restrict the quantity of services available. 7 The ongoing debate over
the necessity of licensing requirements and the barriers to entry
continues to percolate, but many studies show that the effects of
licensing on consumer quality are either negligible or nonexistent, and
that strict licensing schemes cost consumers billions of dollars each
year. 8 While legislative solutions to the licensing problem are being
proposed, 9 many entrepreneurs, businesses, and advocacy groups4. See Marsh, supra note 2, at 1332-33 (noting that widespread requirements now include that
funeral directors be trained embalmers, that funeral directors complete lengthy apprenticeships before
licensure, and that funeral homes contain an embalming room).
5. See Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of
OccupationalLicensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB. EcoN. 1, 4 (2013) (alluding to a study which
found that by 2009, the number of workers nationwide that were subject to state-level licensing
requirements had skyrocketed to twenty-nine percent, compared to about eighteen percent in the late
1980s). See also Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of
Professionals and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation, 65 ECON. HIST. 723, 723-24
(2005).
6. Morris M. Kleiner, OccupationalLicensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 191 (2000) (defining
occupational licensing and explaining the composition of state licensing boards); see also Aaron Edlin
& Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face AntiTrust Scrutiny?,
162 U. PA. L. REv. 1093, 1103 (2014) (finding that in two states, Florida and Tennessee, license-holders
active in the profession have a majority on over ninety percent of boards).
7. Harfoush, supra note 3, at 147 (noting that the benefits of licensing are felt mainly by
established practitioners).
8. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 8, at 1098.
9. See New State PanelBegins Review of Professional Licenses, LNDIANAPOLIS Bus. J. (Sept.
18, 2014), ibj.com/new-state-panel-begins-review-of-professional-licenses/PARAMS/article/49594
(discussing a newly passed Indiana state bill that creates a Job Creation committee tasked with
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faced with the systematic challenges of gaining influence over state
legislatures-are not waiting around for legislative action and instead,
are looking to the courts for assistance. l
However, challenges to
unsuccessful."1
been
part,
most
the
for
have,
regulations
licensing
B. Trends in the FuneralHome Industry
2
The funeral home industry is traditionally a localized practice.'
Recently, it has become much more competitive as new businesses are
seeking to break into the market and established businesses are looking
to expand their operations. 13 Local practitioners and small funeral home
businesses often feel threatened by this trend and have pushed back by
lobbying for laws that make it harder for new businesses to enter the
market and for existing ones to expand. 14
Only two states do not have some type of law or regulatory scheme
that prohibits unlicensed funeral directing. 15 In many states, the term
"funeral directing" has been expanded to include a number of activities,
including: (a) preparing the remains of a body; (b) arranging the
logistical details of the funeral; and (c) selling related products and

reviewing the state's myriad regulatory requirements for professionals). See also Benjamin Brown,
Audit Says NC Doing Bad Job of Ooverseeing Licensing Boards, NEWS OBSERVER (Sept. 9. 2014),
www.newsobserver.com/2014/09/10/4140847/audit-nc-doing-a-bad-job-of-overseeing.html
(discussing
how an audit of North Carolina's professional licensing boards concluded that the system is so deficient
that there is no record of how many professional licensing boards there are).
10. See Heffher v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014).
11. Anthony B. Sanders, Exhumation Through Burial: How Challenging Casket Regulations
Helped Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmilesv. Giles, 88 MINN. L. REV. 668, 671
(2004) (noting that courts in the post-Lochner era have been hesitant to strike down laws under the
substantive due process clause for fear that in doing so, they would be making policy judgments that are
more suited for legislatures). See also Harfoush, supra note 3, at 152 (arguing that in recent cases, the
courts have suggested that litigants upset with the status quo should seek recourse through the
legislature).
12. Marsh, supra note 2, at 1329 (noting that up until the late 20th century, funeral services were
performed by local churches and families).
13. Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F.Supp. 2d 358, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014).
14. See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 2002); St. Joseph Abbey v.
Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2013); Powers v. Harris 379 F.3d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 2004) (all three
of these cases involve challenges to laws that made it illegal to sell caskets without a funeral director's
license).
15. David E. Harrington, Markets: PreservingFuneralMarkets with Ready-to-Embalm Laws, 21
J. ECON. PERSP. 201, 202 (2007). Nineteen states and the District of Columbia explicitly require funeral
directors to have embalming training and/or experience to become licensed. Fourteen additional states
require funeral directors to have graduated from a mortuary science or funeral service school accredited
by the American Board of Funeral Services. All accredited mortuary schools in the United States
require courses in embalming for graduation. Forty-three states and the District of Columbia require
applicants for a funeral director's license to have an embalmer's license or to have served as an
apprentice or resident trainee to a licensed funeral director for periods ranging from one to three years.
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services to the family. 16 Some states explicitly prohibit the sale of
funeral services and products, such as caskets and urns, without a
license. 17 Requirements for obtaining a funeral directing license differ
by state, but most states require the completion of costly apprenticeship
programs or education programs. 18 For example, many states require
funeral directors to attend a two-year mortuary science school, which
emphasizes an outdated curriculum that has not changed since the
1950s.1 9 While these educational requirements may have been
necessary at one point some courts have found that they no longer serve
a legitimate purpose.
Supporters of these regulations feel they are needed to protect the

industry and promote public health. But, many experts argue these
regulations create high barriers to entry in the market and increase the
cost of funeral services and products for consumers. 21 The average cost
for a traditional funeral service in 2012 was $7,045-up $2,000 from
2000 and more than $6,000 from 1970. 22 The funeral home regulatory
industry, comprised of established practitioners, has been blamed for
advocating laws and regulations that thwart competition and have a

16. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-210.20(k) (2011) ('"Practice of funeral service' means
engaging in the care or disposition of dead human bodies or in the practice of disinfecting and preparing
by embalming or otherwise dead human bodies for the funeral service, transportation, burial or
cremation, or in the practice of funeral directing or embalming as presently known, whether under these
titles or designations or otherwise; Practice of funeral service also means engaging in making
arrangements for funeral service, selling funeral supplies to the public or making financial arrangements
for the rendering of such services or the sale of such supplies."). See also Occupational Outlook
Handbook: Funeral Directors: What Funeral Directors Do, BUREAU LAB. STAT., U.S. DEPT. LAB.
(Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/Personal-Care-and-Service/Funeral-directors.htm #tab-2
(listing the common tasks of a funeral director).
17. Marsh, supra note 2, at 1334 n. 37 (noting that at least eleven states define "funeral
directing" to include the sale of merchandise related to funerals or otherwise prohibit the sale of funeral
goods without a license).
18. Id. at 1333.
19. See Brief of Appellees at 3, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591).
See also Brief for the Funeral Consumers Alliance as Amicus Curia in Support of Appellees at 5,
Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591) (noting that despite the recognition that
embalming is an outdated practice with no health or scientific benefits, many schools still require it as
part of the curriculum, and many states still require embalming rooms in all funeral homes); see also
Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002) (striking down a Tennessee law that required the
completion of a mortuary science program for anyone that wanted to sell funeral services, emphasizing
that the program, which included extensive training in embalming, was in no way related to advancing
public health or the sale of caskets).
20. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that since the plaintiffs merely wished
to sell caskets, forcing them to receive education in handling dead bodies, disposing of dead bodies, and
embalming, was unnecessary and burdensome).
21. Harfoush, supra note 3, at 148.
22. See Statistics, NAT'L FUNERAL DIRS. ASS'N, nfda.org/about-funeral-service-/trends-andstatistics.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (full breakdown of funeral costs over the years).
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negative effect on consumers.23

C. Circuit Court Split
A recent circuit court split has placed the constitutional spotlight on
the funeral home industry and raised new questions about the
substantive Due Process Clause. Although the circuit court split is not
the main focus of this Casenote, it illustrates the contentious battle

ensuing over funeral home regulations and provides an appropriate
backdrop to the discussion about Pennsylvania's funeral home
regulations. The circuit split involves three cases addressing the same

regulation prohibiting casket retailers from selling
caskets in the state
25
license.
director's
funeral
a
obtaining
without
In Craigmiles v. Giles, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the regulation violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of

the Fourteenth Amendment. 26 In its ruling, the Sixth Circuit rejected the
state's argument that protection of the local funeral home industry was a
legitimate state interest that could be pursued. 27 The Craigmiles court
found that the regulation bore no rational relation to the state's supposed

goal of protecting the health and safety of the public and, instead, the
regulation only advanced the goal of protecting the local business from

outside competition, which the court found to be an illegitimate
independent purpose. In St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille,the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered the same question. 29 Ultimately, the Fifth

Circuit sided with the Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles, holding that the
licensing law was enacted for the sole purpose of protecting local

funeral directors from competition
and accordingly, bore no relation to a
30
legitimate state interest.
In Powers v. Harris, the Tenth Circuit Court of A Upeals reached a

different conclusion by upholding a similar regulation.

Although the

23. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 229 (invalidating a funeral director licensing requirement. Judge
Bogg wrote "we invalidate only the General Assembly's naked attempt to raise a fortress protecting the
monopoly rents that funeral directors extract from consumers"). See also Brief of Appellees at 39,
Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591).
24. Craigmiles,312 F.3d at 225; St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2013);
Powers v. Harris 379 F.3d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 2004).
25. Craigmiles,312 F.3d at 225; St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at219; Powers, 379 F.3d at 225.
26. Craigmiles,312 F.3d at 225.
27. Id.
28. Id. (noting that when the Tennessee legislature originally enacted the licensing law in 1951,
the statutory definition of funeral directing did not include the sale of caskets. Twenty years later, the
law was amended to include "the selling of caskets" under the definition).
29. St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d 215.
30. Id.
31. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004).
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Tenth Circuit applied the same rational basis test required by the
substantive due process framework, it applied a standard more
deferential to the government and held that the state's interest in
protecting the local market was valid.3 2
The inconsistent results in these cases underscore the difficulties

courts face while analyzing policy justifications underlying certain laws,
as well as the varying standards courts adopt under the rational basis
test. 33 This circuit split is one example of the legal battles that have
ensued over controversial regulations in the funeral home industryregulations that dictate how parties will be able to vie for control of the
market. It is also important to note that while the outcomes of other
cases hinged mainly on a substantive due process question, Heffner v.
Murphy raised a Commerce Clause question as well, because the

plaintiffs argued that the regulations were designed and maintained to
give an advantage to in-state funeral home directors. It was the first
case involving funeral home regulations to do so.
D. Pennsylvania'sFuneralHome Regulations
Although many states have set up regulator37 schemes that insulate

local practitioners from outside competition,

Pennsylvania has far

exceeded the norm by enacting and maintaining one of the most
protectionist regulatory schemes in the country. 35 In 1952, Pennsylvania
enacted the Funeral Director Law (FDL).36 While the statute has been

amended on occasion there have not been significant changes since
enactment of the law.i The purpose behind the FDL was to "provide
for the better protection of life and health of the citizens ...by requiring

and regulating the examination, licensure and registration of persons and
registration of corporations engaging in the care, preparation and

32. Id.at 1222 (in its ruling, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that there was no precedent to suggest
that a state could not favor one industry over another. The Tenth Circuit also criticized the Craigmiles
court, for employing a standard that was not deferential enough).
33. See Sanders, supra note 11,at 696 (noting that in light of recent decisions, fears that a more
active rational basis test would lead to a usurpation of legislative power and that the Supreme Court has
reserved a narrow area for striking down laws for violating economic substantive due process).
34. See Harrington, supranote 15.
35. Expert Report of David E. Harrington at 4, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014)
(No. 12-3591) (noting that Pennsylvania is the only state in the country that imposes all of the following
regulations on funeral markets: (1) funeral homes may operate only one principal location and branch;
(2) only licensed funeral directors may own funeral homes; (3) funeral directors may only practice at
one principal location and a branch; (4) all funeral home locations must have an embalming preparation
room; and (5) all home locations must have a full-time, dedicated supervisor).
36. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. §479.1 (2014).
37. Complaint at 15, Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (No. 08-cv-990).
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disposition of the bodies of deceased persons. '

38

259
The Pennsylvania

State Board of Funeral Directors (BFD) is the administrative body
charged with enforcement of the law, meaning that the BFD is
authorized to formulate rules and regulations to carry out the law's
purpose. 39 The FDL provides that the BFD must be comprised of nine

members, five of whom must be licensed funeral directors. 40 The
Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Association (PFDA), the state's largest
trade association of funeral directors, exerts unfettered influence over
the BFD. 4 1 In fact, a majority of members serving on the BFD are
simultaneously members of the PFDA.42 Given that the PFDA's
outspoken purpose is to "protect and promote the independent, family-

owned funeral home and the traditional funeral," it is not surprising that
the BFD has been accused of promulgating rules and regulations aimed
at advancing the interests of established funeral directors instead of the
funeral home market as a whole. 43 In fact, many people, both inside and
outside the industry, feel the BFD is driven by anti-competitive and
protectionist motives. 44 This likely is due, at least in part, to pressure
applied by market veterans who see the increased competition in
Pennsylvania's funeral home industry as a threat to their market share
and an affront to the traditionally localized nature of the market.4 5
Although the FDL's provisions are relatively straightforward, the BFD
38. Brief of Appellees at 4, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591) (Board
Member Murphy, the PFDA's former counsel, even conceded that most funeral directors do not know
the difference between the PFDA and the BFD).
39. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 479.16(a) (the board also is authorized to appoint an inspector or
inspectors to "serve all processes and papers of the board, and [who] shall have the right of entry into
any place, where the business or profession of funeral directing is carried on."). See id. § 479.16(b).
40. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 479.19(a) (the FDL provides that the board shall consist of "the
Commissioner of Professional and Occupational Affairs, the Director of the Bureau of Consumer
Protection in the Office of Attorney General, or his designee, two members appointed by the Governor,
who shall be representing the public at large, and five members appointed by the Governor who shall be
licensed funeral directors of good moral character and who shall also have been actively engaged in the
practice of funeral directing for at least 10 years.").
41. Brief of Appellees at 3, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 3-4 (it should also be noted that most members of the PFDA are "small, mom-and-pop
businesses consisting of one to two people.").
44. See Brief for John F. Givnish as Amicus Curia in Support of Appellees at 3, Heffner v.
Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591) (arguing that the exceptions to the rules created by
the BFD for family owned funeral directors serve no purpose other than to ensure that the dominance of
small, family-owned funeral homes in Pennsylvania remains undisturbed by out-of-state competition).
45. See Complaint at 20-21, Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (No. 08cv-990) (pointing out that increased competition in the funeral home industry not only includes new
funeral directors, but: (a) licensed insurance agents, who may be selling life insurance to fund pre-need
policies; (b) insurance companies; (c) crematoriums and cemetarians and (d) market giants such as
Costco beginning to sell caskets). See also id. at 21 (noting that over the past several years, the PFDA
has expressed its concerns that the industry is "under attack" in newsletters, memos, and solicitations for
money).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 6

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84

exerts considerable enforcement46discretion, and has, at times, enforced
the provisions rather selectively.
E. The FDL'sRegulatory Scheme
The regulatory scheme embodied in the FDL contains a number of
distinct, yet complicated, regulations supposedly aimed at advancing the
FDL's purpose: promoting the health and safety of the industry. 47 One
of the most controversial regulations involves a restriction on who can
possess an ownership interest in a funeral home. 48 Generally, a funeral
home in Pennsylvania can be owned only by a licensed funeral
director. 49 Pennsylvania, like many states, requires the completion of
extensive training and education programs in order to become
licensed. 50 Once licensed, funeral directors can operate the business as a
sole proprietorship, partnership,
professional corporation, or restricted
51
business corporation (RBC).
However, there are a number of exceptions to these licensure
requirements. While a funeral home owner must generally possess a
license, a license can be passed on to the licensee's estate or the
licensee's widow upon his or her death. 52 Essentially, the license can be
46. See Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358, 381 (M.D. Pa. 2012), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (the district court struck down the FDL's provision granting the BFD
the authority to inspect funeral homes, given that the provision did not impose any constraints on
frequency, time, or scope, and given that the frequency, nature, and extent of an inspection, is usually up
to the inspector). See also Brief of Appellees, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 at 11 (3d Cir. 2014)
(No. 12-3591) (citing an Audit Report compiled by the state legislature, where findings of the report
included that: (a) the BFD had a goal of inspecting each funeral home annually, but only half had been
inspected in a fourteen-month period; (b) a current board report shows that some funeral homes have not
been inspected in years; and (c) while some are not inspected for years, others receive multiple
inspections).
47. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 479.1 (2014).
48. Id. § 479.8(a), (d), (e).
49. Brief for John F. Givinish as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 3 Heffner v. Murphy,
745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591); 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 479.1 (2014); 63 PA. STAT. ANN.
§479.2 (2014) ("the term 'funeral director' shall also mean a person who makes arrangements for
funeral service and who sells funeral merchandise to the public incidental to such service or who makes
financial arrangements for the rendering of such services and the sale of merchandise.").
50. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 479.3 (listing the requirements for licensure: each applicant shall have
successfully completed a course of actual class work in didactic and laboratory studies in a school of
embalming for a period fixed by the board at not less than 900 hours, nor more than 2,400 hours, and
shall have completed two years as a resident trainee. Applicants must also successfully complete two
years of academic work at a college or university accredited by the Department of Education, and a one
year course at a mortuary college or university accredited by the American Board of Funeral Service
Education Inc.).
51. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 479.8.
52. Id. § 479.8(a) (The board is authorized to issue a license to the estate of a deceased funeral
director for a period not exceeding three years. If the license is transferred directly to a widow or
widowers, there are no time limitations, as long as they remain unmarried and seek approval from the
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"handed down" to the licensee's estate or widow. Individuals falling
under this exception can circumvent the burdensome process of
obtaining a license and can meet the FDL's requirements for funeral
home ownership and operation merely by appointing a funeral director
to manage and supervise the funeral home because, pursuant to the FDL,
every funeral home must have a full-time dedicated supervisor who is a
licensed funeral director. 53 The estate of a deceased funeral director
may possess the license
for up to three years, but a widow can possess
54
the license forever.
Additionally, the spouse, children and grandchildren of either a
licensed funeral director or a deceased licensed funeral director may
own the stock of an RBC. 55 This is the case even if the license is not
"handed down" from a deceased funeral director, or, in the case of a
deceased licensee's estate, the three year time limit for possessing the
"handed down" license has expired.56 An RBC is a corporate license
issued to licensed funeral directors; it can only be issued to a
Pennsylvania corporation that is formed for the sole purpose of
conducting a funeral directing practice. 57 Therefore, corporations not
incorporated under Pennsylvania law are ineligible for an RBC
license. 58 Anyone who owns shares in an RBC can own and operate a
funeral home, as long as they comply with all other rules and
guidelines. 59 In order to receive and keep the license, a number of
requirements must be met, including, but not limited to: (1) all
shareholders of the corporation must be licensed funeral directors or
family members of a licensed funeral director; (2) the corporation must
have a licensed funeral director employed as a full-time supervisor and;
(3) the corporation cannot own shares of stock or any property interest
in
anotherthose
funeral
establishment.
owning RBC
shares
transfer
shares
freely to theirIndividuals
family members
as long
as can
the

board).
53. Id. § 479.8(a), (b)(6), (d), (e).
54. Id. § 479.8(a).
55. Id. § 479.8 (b)(4).
56. Id.
57. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 479.8(b).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. § 479.8 (b) (A full list of the requirements includes: (a) the corporation engages in no
other business activity; (b) it holds no shares of stock or any property interest in any other funeral
establishment; (c) one or more of its principal corporate officers is a licensed funeral director who also
is a member of the board of directors; (d) all of its shareholders are licensed funeral directors or the
members of the immediate family of a licensed funeral director or deceased licensed funeral director
who was a shareholder at death; (e) the proper paperwork has been filed; and (f) the corporation has, for
each place of business, registered with the board, the name of the licensed funeral director who will
serve as the full-time supervisor).
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transfer of those shares does not place the RBC in violation
of the FDL
61
requirements for receiving and maintaining a license.
Under Pennsylvania law, there is only one way for an out-of-state
corporation to own and operate funeral homes in the state: they must
purchase a rare pre-1935 license. 62 These are shares of corporations that

were incorporated for the purpose of owning funeral homes prior to
1935 and were grandfathered in by the FDL. 63 There are approximately
seventy-five pre-1935 licenses in existence and, due to their rarity, these
licenses are expensive and hard to find.64 Any individual or corporation
in possession of one of these pre-1935 licenses
can own and operate a
65
funeral home without obtaining a license.
The FDL's provisions, taken together, severely limit the legal options

for an out-of-state corporation seeking to expand its funeral home
operation into Pennsylvania. The only avenue for such a corporation is
to purchase one of the rare and expensive pre-1935 licenses. 66 One
other key restriction under the FDL prohibits individuals in possession
of any corporate license-whether it be an RBC or a pre-1935 licensefrom owning more than one restricted corporate license or own shares in
more than one restricted corporation. 67 The FDL does not require any
unlicensed owners-that is, owners who either are handed down a

license from a deceased licensed funeral director, own a share in an
RBC, or own a corporation with a pre-1935 license-to possess any
68
skill,
knowledge
in funeral
directing.
The ¢ must only
appointtraining,
a funeralordirector
to serve
as a full-time
supervisor.o6

61. Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358, 390 n. 20 (M.D. Pa. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting the plaintiff's correctly pointed out that the FDL contains no
restriction on the number of RBCs or the number of RBC shares. Owners routinely take advantage of
this by transferring ownership shares to family members while continuing to manage the day-to-day
operations of their facility).
62. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. §479.8(a) (2014). See also Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 63 (3d Cir.
2014) (noting that prior to 1935, Pennsylvania issued funeral directing licenses to individuals and
corporations, and that when the Pennsylvania General Assembly imposed restrictions on corporate
licensure, the Pennsylvania General Assembly eventually allowed a total of seventy-five pre-1935
licenses to be grandfathered into the new law).
63. Hefher, 745 F.3d at 63.
64. Brief of John F. Givinish as Amicus Curia in Support of Appellees at 3, Heffner v. Murphy,
745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591). See also Brief of Appellees at 17, Heffner v. Murphy, 745
F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No.12-3591) (noting that pre-1935 licenses were once selling for around
$100,000).
65. Brief of Appellees, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591).
66. Id. at 18. See also Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358, 388 (M.D. Pa. 2012), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding that the effect of the FDL provisions, was to
prevent out-of-state corporations from entering the market, unless they purchase a pre-1935 license.
This limitation heavily burdens out-of-state parties while benefiting in-state economic interests).
67. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. §479.8(b), (d) (2014).
68. Id. §§479.8(a), (b)(6).
69. Id.
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To summarize, any out-of-state party seeking to own and operate a
funeral home in Pennsylvania must either satisfy the burdensome
requirements of licensure or purchase an interest in an expensive pre1935 license. 70 However, the FDL creates an exemption for the families
of licensed Pennsylvania funeral directors which enables them to
circumvent these burdens. 7 1 It is important to note that the FDL
regulations do not explicitly mention in-state residency; all of the
exemptions apply to funeral directors licensed in the state of
Pennsylvania, meaning that licensure exemptions could apply to the
families of funeral directors licensed in Pennsylvania but living outside
of the state.7 2 Although the Third Circuit, in Heffner, acknowledged
that the majority of funeral directors who obtain a license in
Pennsylvania will choose to reside in Pennsylvania, the court
emphasized this distinction when concluding
that the regulatory scheme
73
did not violate the Commerce Clause.
1. The "One and a Branch" Restriction
The FDL not only imposes restrictions on who can own a funeral
home in Pennsylvania, but it also imposes restrictions on the number of
funeral home locations a party can own. 74 Generally, the FDL restricts
ownership to two individual funeral homes---one principal location and
one branch location. 75 This is known as the "one and a branch"
restriction. 76 This restriction applies to any party authorized to own and
operate a funeral home, regardless of whether they are family members
being handed down a license, corporations possessing a pre-1935 share,
or family members who are transferred shares of an RBC.77 This
regulation prevents out-of-state parties from "clustering," which is one
of the primary advantages for out-of-state competitors and one of the
only ways in which they can affordably and feasibly operate funeral

70. See supratext accompanying notes 62-68.
71. Aside from purchasing a pre-1935 share, which anybody can do, the only way that an
unlicensed individual can own a funeral home is if they are related to a Pennsylvania funeral director.
72. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. §479.8(a), (b), (c) (2014).
73. Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 76 (3d Cir. 2014).
74. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. §479.8(e) (2014).
75. Id. ("No licensed funeral director shall be eligible to apply for more than one restricted
corporate license or own shares in more than one restricted corporation. Nor shall any licensed funeral
director who obtains a restricted corporate license or holds shares in a restricted corporation have any
stock or proprietary interest in any other funeral establishment, except a branch place of practice as
authorized by subsection (e).").
76. Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 71 (3d Cir. 2014).
77. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. §479.8(a), (e) (2014).
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The term

"clustering" describes the method by which firms open and operate
numerous locations in one centralized area so they can share personnel

across locations, lower labor costs, and operate a centralized facility
where bodies are prepared. 79 In order for an out-of-state firm to
"cluster" in Pennsylvania, it would have to purchase multiple pre-1935
licenses, but licensed Pennsylvania funeral directors can easily
circumvent this restriction by transferring shares of an RBC to a family
member. 80 For example, families in the funeral home industry can
easily expand their operation simply by having the licensed funeral
director transfer some of their RBC shares to another family member
who would then be able to open a new facility. 81 The FDL does not
contain any limitation on the number of RBC shares that a funeral
director's family members may own, nor does it require the licensed
82
funeral director to supervise facilities operated by family members.
The inability to "cluster" negatively affects prospective funeral home
owners attempting to break into the market by driving up costs. 83 It also
disproportionately affects out-of-state parties since they are forced to
equip each funeral home with a preparation room and cannot consolidate
embalming operations in one location-a strategy that would
undoubtedly make it easier for out-of-state parties who cannot

78. Brief of Appellees at 25, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591).
Expert Report of David E. Harrington at 19, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 123591).
79. Expert Report of David E. Harrington at 18, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014)
(No.12-3591) (finding that funeral homes can lower the average cost of producing funerals by operating
multiple funeral homes in close proximity to one another. This increases productivity of the funeral
directors, because they can be moved to where they are needed. Clustering decreases the average cost
of funerals because embalming facilities are operated closer to capacity and directors, embalmers, and
cosmetologists are kept busier, allowing a firm to reduce hiring). Brief for John F. Givnish as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Appellees at 4, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d. Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591)
(arguing that the FDL's ownership limitations prevents out-of-state parties from utilizing the benefits of
clustering; out-of-state parties have to either purchase multiple pre-1935 licenses to own and operate
more than two facilities, while licensed directors can freely transfer their shares in "RBCs" to enable
family members to open multiple facilities.)
80. Brief of Appellees at 25, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591).
81. Expert Report of David Harrington at 31, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014)
(No. 12-3591) (while the FDL limits who can own a funeral home, it does not restrict who can own or
lease the assets of a funeral home. One member of the board sold substantially all of the assets of his
funeral home to an unlicensed corporation, while remaining a nominal shareholder of the funeral home
entity).
82. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. §479.8(b)(4) (2014). See also Brief for John F. Givinish as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Appeflees at 4, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591).
83. Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358, 400 (M.D. Pa. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing a report estimating that today it would cost between $193,000 and
$223,000 to build and equip a new preparation room).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol84/iss1/6

12

Begovic: Funeral Home Field Advantage: How Pennsylvania Funeral Directors
2016]

FUNERAL HOME FIELD ADVANTAGE

micromanage each facility like a local practitioner. 84
F. Pennsylvania GeneralAssembly Investigates and Makes Findings

In 1994, the Pennsylvania General Assembly Legislative Budget and
Finance Committee (the Committee) conducted a performance audit of
the State Board of Funeral Directors and published its findings in an
Audit Report. 85 The Committee found that the FDL is "essentially the
same in purpose and scope as laws dating back to the 1930s" and that
"advances in mortuary science and health regulation have virtually
eliminated the public health risks associated with preparation and
disposition of the deceased. 86 The Audit Report concluded that the
BFD, through its regulations, was not performing functions that were
essential to public health and safety. 87 Chief among the report's
findings was that the FDL lacked "consumer protection, and imposes
upon funeral directors and funeral homes requirements which add to the
88
cost of funerals but do not really benefit or protect the general public."
Finally, the Audit Report verified what many had known for a long
time: the Pennsylvania funeral home market is dominated by small,
family-owned business. Furthermore, the audit concluded that the
FDL's various provisions perpetuate this trend by shielding the market
from outside competition.89 In light of the Committee's findings, the
BFD recommended that the FDL be amended to address the growing
concerns expressed in the Audit Report, but the Pennsylvania General
Assembly has not acted on these recommendations
to modify the law or
90
limit the BFD's enforcement power.
III. THE

THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN HEFFNER

A. Dormant Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause grants Congress the authority to regulate
commerce among the several states.
The dormant Commerce
84. Id.
85.

PA. GEN. ASSEMB., LEGISLATIVE BUDGET & FIN. COMM, PERFORMANCE AUDIT: STATE

BOARD OF FuNERAL DIRECTORS (1994).
86. Id. at 0705 and 0694-95.
87. Id. at 0698.
88. Id. at 0914 (the Board Chairman even testified that the FDL serves the interests of
Pennsylvania Funeral Directors and not the general public). See also id. at 1321.
89. Id. at 0842.
90. Brief of Appellees at 3, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591). See
also Complaint at 6, Heffher v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (No. 08-cv-990).
91. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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Clause-a judicially created doctrine-was born when the Supreme
Court held that the Commerce Clause does not only grant Congress the
sole power to regulate interstate commerce, but it also prevent states
from passing laws and regulations that interfere with interstate
commerce. The Supreme Court subsequently expounded on this
interpretation to hold that the dormant Commerce Clause prevents states

from treating in-state economic interests and out-of-state economic
interests differently in a way that provides in-state parties with an unfair
advantage over out-of-state parties. 9 3 A dormant Commerce Clause

analysis involves a two-prong test: (1) a court must determine whether a
law discriminates against out-of-state commerce in either purpose or

effect, and if it is discriminatory, the law must withstand heightened
scrutiny; and (2) if a law is not found to be discriminatory in either
purpose or effect, a court must employ a balancing test to determine
whether the law's burden on interstate commerce substantially
outweighs its putative local benefits. 94 A state law is discriminatory in
effect when, in practice, it affects similarly situated entities in a market

by imposing disproportionate burdens on out-of-state interests and
conferring advantages upon in-state interests. 95 The second prong of the
test was established in Pike v. Bruce Church, and is commonly referred
to as the Pike balancing test. 96 Courts have considerable discretion
under the first prong, and, because of this, there is wide disagreement
97
over how deferential a dormant Commerce Clause analysis should be.

While some courts are more accepting of a state's articulated reasons for
92. See Quill Corp. v. N.D., 504, U.S. 298, 309 (1992) (noting that the U.S. Constitution does
not say anything about the protection of interstate commerce in the absence of any action by Congress).
See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) (suggesting that the
Commerce Clause is more than an affirmative grant of power; it has a negative implication as well. The
Clause, "by its own force" prohibits states from interfering with interstate commerce, even if Congress
has not acted.)
93. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (noting that the framers wanted to avoid
the tendencies of economic balkanization that plagued the early colonies)..
94. Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 70 (3d Cir. 2014). See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970). See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579-80 (1995) (explaining that the Pike
Balancing Test is needed because "states may not impose regulations that place an undue burden on
interstate commerce, even where those regulations do not discriminate."). See also Or. Waste Sys., Inc.
v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
95. Or. WasteSys.,511 U.S. 93.
96. Pike, 397 U.S. 137 (striking down an Arizona law that prohibited interstate shipment of
cantaloupes that did not meet strict packaging requirements, finding that the state's interest in protecting
the reputation of growers was legitimate, but not justified, in light of the burden imposed by the law on
interstate commerce). But see Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Mich. PSC, 545 U.S. 429 (2005) (upholding a
Michigan law that imposed a flat $100 annual fee on trucks engaged in intrastate commercial hauling.
Since the law only affected activity within the state, it did not have an effect on interstate commerce).
97. Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1213 (1986) (noting that the criteria for determining the
validity of state statutes effecting the Commerce Clause has varied widely).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol84/iss1/6

14

Begovic: Funeral Home Field Advantage: How Pennsylvania Funeral Directors

2016]

FUNERAL HOME FIELD ADVANTAGE

a law, 98 other courts heavily scrutinize the policy justifications behind a
law and attempt to discern a hidden motive not explicit in the language
of a law. 9 9 Similarly, some courts are reluctant to look at a law's
practical impact if it does not facially discriminate based on state
interests. 100
Conversely, other courts do not hesitate to find a
discriminatory effect despite the absence of facially discriminatory

language. 10 1 In Heffner v. Murphy, the Third Circuit was reluctant to
look beyond the language of the law, discern any hidden motives, or
consider the broad impact of the law, and, instead, emphasized
the
02
FDL's neutral language with respect to Pennsylvania residency. 1
B. The Third Circuit'sApproach in Heffner
The Third Circuit began its analysis by first looking at whether the

FDL discriminates against interstate commerce in either its purpose or
its effect. 10 3 The plaintiffs in Heffner maintained that all of the FDL's
provisions, taken together, had the effect of imposing high barriers to
entry on out-of-state parties, thereby violating the dormant Commerce
Clause. 104
However, the Third
05 Circuit decided to analyze each
challenged provision separately. 1

1. The "One and a Branch" Limitation
The plaintiffs in Heffner argued that the one and a branch limitation
negates the advantage out-of-state competitors would gain by clustering,

thereby discriminating in favor of small, family-owned Pennsylvania
funeral homes. 10 6 The plaintiffs also challenged the state's claim that
98. See Heffner, 745 F.3d 56 (upholding Pennsylvania's controversial funeral home regulations
on the grounds that the regulations contained no explicit discriminatory language).
99. See Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 2006) (striking down a bill that favored in-state
farmers on the grounds that the legislative history leading up to the voter approved amendment evinced
a discriminatory intent).
100. See Heffner, 745 F.3d at 72.
101. See Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 9-17 (1st Cir. 2010) (striking down a
Massachusetts statute that mandated differential distribution methods of wines based on the size of the
winery on the grounds that the law, despite containing no discriminatory language, had the effect of
advantaging Massachusetts wineries).
102. Hefiner, 745 F.3d at 72.
103. Id. at 70.
104. Brief for the Funeral Consumers Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 1-4,
Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591).
105. Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 71 (3d Cir. 2014).
106. Id. at 71. See also Brief for John F. Givnish as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 5,
Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591) (highlighting interrogatory answers
submitted to the district court whereby it was admitted that the ownership restrictions are intended to
"serve the legitimate interest in having a local business owned by local people").
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the restriction was needed to preserve the fairness of the marketplace
and prevent corporate monopolization. 07 In support of this argument,
the plaintiffs pointed to the FDL's exemption for families of
Pennsylvania licensed funeral directors, which allows them to transfer
RBC shares freely and open multiple funeral homes, as evidence that the
10 8
state was being duplicitous and failing to meet its own purported goal.
According to the plaintiffs, the FDL's obvious goal is to protect small,
high-cost Pennsylvania funeral homes, because a licensed funeral
director practicing in another state cannot open a location in
Pennsylvania without violating the one and a branch provision.I°9 Even
if the court was unable or unwilling to discern a discriminatory purpose
in light of the evidence presented, the plaintiffs still urged the court to
find a discriminatory effect. 110 The thrust of the plaintiffs' overarching
argument was that the FDL's discriminatory purpose and effect could
not be justified by any legitimate goal the state was pursuing
and,
11
therefore, the FDL should be invalidated under the first prong.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs maintained that even if the court did not
find that the FDL discriminated in either purpose or effect, it should still
be struck down under the Pike balancing test because the FDL's
discriminatory impact outweighs its putative local benefits-benefits
that, according to the plaintiffs, amount to nothing more than having a
local industry owned by local people. 112 The plaintiffs claimed that this
was not a legitimate benefit because "preservation of a local industry by
protecting it from interstate competition is the type of protectionism"
that the Commerce Clause prohibits. 113 To prove that the FDL's
discriminatory impact outweighed any putative local benefits, the
plaintiffs presented numerous economic studies supported by economic
data. 114 These studies showed that the market in Pennsylvania was
dominated by Pennsylvania businesses and that the FDL's provisions
107. Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358, 390 (M.D. Pa. 2012), affd in part, rev 'd in part,
745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014).
108. Brief of Appellees at 28, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591)
(arguing that the FDL cannot possibly advance the goal of preventing market domination when a
licensed Pennsylvania funeral director can own any number of funeral homes by transferring RBC
shares to family members; the fact that many members on the board own more than 10 funeral homes is
evidence of this).
109. Brief of Appellees at 34, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591).
110. Brief of Appellees at 25, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-359 1)
(arguing that the FDL has the effect of discriminating against out-of-state interests since out-of-state
funeral home owners cannot exploit the advantages of clustering).
111. Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358, 384 (M.D. Pa. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014).
112. Id. at 384.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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were actually harming the market and consumers.115
The Third Circuit found none of these arguments persuasive.
Despite the plaintiffs' insistence that the court should look beyond the
text of the statute, the Third Circuit focused primarily on the neutral
language of the FDL provisions, which does not facially discriminate
against out-of-state residents. 117 Rather, the FDL treats all parties the
same with respect to residency. 118 While the Third Circuit recognized
that the law probably makes it more difficult for out-of-state funeral
home directors to practice in the state and that the vast majority of
individuals who obtain a Pennsylvania funeral directing license will
choose to reside in-state, it did not subject the law to heightened scrutiny
because the FDL "operates evenhandedly as to both in-state and out-ofstate interests." 119 Although out-of-state funeral directors cannot utilize
the advantages of "clustering," the Third Circuit found that the neutral
language of the law meant that all interests were burdened in the same
way under the FDL. 12 The key distinction that ultimately dictated the
outcome for the Third Circuit was that all of the FDL provisions and
exemptions were predicated on Pennsylvania licensure and not
Pennsylvania residency;121 a licensed funeral director who lives in Ohio
and a licensed funeral director who lives in Pennsylvania both are barred
from owning more than two establishments.
Finding that the one and a branch restriction did not discriminate in
either purpose or effect, the Third Circuit looked at the overall effect of
the provision to determine whether it disproportionately burdened outof-state interests under the second prong. 12 2 The Third Circuit
ultimately found that the one and a branch provision survived the Pike
balancing test. 123 Once again, the Third Circuit emphasized that the
neutral language of the law signaled that the restriction was imposed
124 For that reason, the
equally
on both
out-of-state
and in-state
parties.on
Third Circuit
viewed
the provision
as a "burden
commerce" but not a
115. See Expert Report of David Harrington at 15, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014)
(No. 12-3591) (noting that there is a disproportionately high number of funeral homes in Pennsylvania
owned by small family-owned businesses). See also Heffner, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (arguing that an
excessive number of small funeral homes performing fewer funerals actually increases costs for
consumers, because the establishments are forced to raise prices)
116. Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014).
117. Id.at 72.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Heffner, 745 F.3d at 73 (noting that the FDL imposes the same benefits on Pennsylvania
residents as it imposes on non-residents).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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"discriminatory burden on interstate commerce."' 12 5 Essentially, the
economic realities of Pennsylvania's funeral home market could not be
attributed to the one and a branch provision if the provision did not, in
theory, make a distinction based on residency.
2. Licensing Restrictions
The plaintiffs in Heffner also sought to invalidate the FDL's licensure
provisions regulating who can own and operate a funeral home in
Pennsylvania under the dormant Commerce Clause test. 126
The
plaintiffs argued that while out-of-state parties must either fulfill the
burdensome process of licensure or buy an expensive pre-1935 share,
the families of Pennsylvania funeral directors are exempted from these
requirements. 12 7 The Third Circuit's analysis of the FDL's licensing
restrictions was similar to its analysis of the one and a branch provision
in the sense that the Third Circuit emphasized the neutral language of
the provisions. 128 The Third Circuit found that, because the FDL's
provisions do not discriminate with respect to residency, the FDL did
not "erect a barrier" protecting in-state interests from out-of-state
competition. 12 9 For example, under the FDL, all general corporations
are ineligible for a license, regardless of their location. 130 Furthermore,
anyone, regardless of residency, can obtain a license under the FDL and
enjoy the same benefits that the FDL grants all other licensees. 131 With
respect to state residency, the FDL's neutrality was enough to shield it
from further judicial scrutiny. The Third Circuit concluded that the FDL
did not discriminate in either effect or purpose against out-of-state
residents, and it declined to draw inferences of the FDL's purpose or
effect from extrinsic evidence proffered by the plaintiffs absent explicit
language to indicate a discriminatory purpose or effect. 132 The Third
Circuit's analysis of this provision differed drastically from the district
court's approach; the district court, when scrutinizing the provision's
purported rationale and ascertaining the impact of the FDL on out-ofstate parties, placed significant weight on findings made by the BFD and
studies quantifying the economic impact of the provision. 133 For the
125. Id.
126. Heffner, 745 F.3d at 73.
127. Id. at 73-76.
128. Id. at 74.
129. Id.
130. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. §479.8 (b) (2014).
131. Id. §479.8(b), (a). Heffner, 745 F.3d at 75 (pointing out that family members qualifying for
the exemptions may live in another state while still enjoying the benefit).
132. Id.
133. Hefftier v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358, 398-99 (M.D. Pa. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in
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district court, the absence of any explicit discriminatory language in the
FDL did not preclude a finding that the FDL has a discriminatory effect
that the FDL warranted invalidation under the Pike
and purpose or
134
test.
balancing
IV. CRITICISM OF THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN HEFFNER

The Third Circuit's decision to focus primarily on the FDL's
language while blindly accepting the state's articulated goals, despite
evidence suggesting that the goals were not being advanced, stands in
stark contrast to approaches taken by other courts. 135 It also highlights
the different approaches courts will employ when presented with a
dormant Commerce Clause question. More specifically, the difference
is centered on how deferential a court should be towards a legislature
when attempting to discern a law's purpose and effect. The Third
Circuit's approach in Heffner demonstrates a highly deferential
approach-an approach where a court is hesitant to discern a law's
underlying purpose or effect by looking at extrinsic evidence out of fear
that it might usurp legislative power. With this approach, courts ignore
extrinsic evidence that has the tendency to refute, or at least weaken, the
state's policy justifications for a law. Furthermore, the Third Circuit's
decision to analyze each of the provisions separately, without
considering the cumulative impact of the provisions, is an approach that
should be eschewed in favor of one that looks at the collective impact of
individual provisions.
A. The Third Circuit'sDecision to Separate the FDL Provisions
The Third Circuit's decision to analyze each FDL provision
separately disregards the practical function of laws and regulatory
schemes. A regulatory scheme must be viewed holistically when
discerning its purpose and effect. Rarely is it the case that the individual
provisions embodied in a statutory scheme function independently of
one another. A holistic approach is more appropriate when courts must
discern legislative intent. Courts, when discerning legislative intent,
have acknowledged that words or phrases must be viewed in the context
part, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (highlighting the board's own recognition that the FDL's ownership
restriction is inconsistent with its policy permitting one funeral director to assist another funeral director
to rebut the state's claim that the provision promotes public health and safety. The court also pointed to
the board's recognition that this area needs clarification so that in-state and out-of-state interests are not
burdened by the threat of prosecution to illustrate the burden placed on interstate commerce).
134. Id.
135. See Jones v. Gale 470 F.3d 1261 (6th Cir. 2006). See also Family Winemakers of Cal. v.
Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 2010).
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of the comprehensive statutory scheme.1 36 This principle of statutory
interpretation should also apply to a dormant Commerce Clause analysis
because discerning legislative intent is an integral part of ascertaining
the purpose of a law. Some lower courts have applied this principle to a
dormant Commerce Clause analysis, concluding that the purpose of a
statute must be discerned from the statute as a whole, not its isolated
bits.' 37 Although individual provisions in a comprehensive regulatory
scheme might be facially non-discriminatory, the law or regulatory
scheme embodying those individual provisions can indicate a
discriminatory effect or purpose that is masked by the facially neutral
language of each individual provision. This is especially true if
individual provisions each have a negligible effect on out-of-state
parties but have a much more profound effect when functioning
together.
Separating a law's individual provisions may be easier for courts that
are wary of usurping judicial power by pointing to a law's incidental
impact as evidence of a discriminatory effect or purpose. However, the

Commerce Clause framework requires more than a naked inquiry into
the language of each individual provision; it requires courts to examine

the context surrounding a challenged law.138 The Third Circuit ignored
evidence showing a marketplace in which in-state interests thrived
mainly because the individual provisions, according to the Third Circuit,
could not in theory have that effect. But state laws that alter conditions

of competition to favor in-state interests over out-of-state competitors in
139
aneutral
marketthe
have
always been
invalidated,
howCircuit's
facially
14
individual
provisions
may be.regardless
The of
Third

136. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987) (the plain meaning of the statute's words,
enlightened by their context and contemporaneous legislative history, can control the determination of
legislative purpose). See also Dolan v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (noting that
"interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the
purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities to inform the analysis);
Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989) (noting that "the words of a statute must be read
in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme"); Kenneth A. Klukowski,
Severability Doctrine: How Much of a Statute Should Federal Courts Invalidate?, 16 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 1, 50 (2011) (when examining statutes-especially long and complex statutes-readers must get a
gestalt of the statute and derive a sense of the overall scheme created by the statute).
137. Alliance of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 37-38 (1st Cir. 2005) (focusing on the
original statue and the two added amendments to determine whether the law had a discriminatory
purpose or effect).
138. See S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 596 (8th Cir. 2003) (pointing to
indications from the drafters of an amendment, such as a "pro" and "pro-con" statement compiled by the
Secretary of State and disseminated to voters).
139. Polar lce Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 376-77 (1964).
140. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (even if a state law responds to legitimate local
concerns and is not discriminatory either in its purpose or on its face, the law could discriminate
arbitrarily against interstate commerce by having a discriminatory effect).
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decision to separate the challenged provisions foreclosed a proper
inquiry into the law's discriminatory effect. This is because the current
market conditions in Pennsylvania cannot be attributed to any one of the
FDL's individual

provisions,

given that

the provisions

operate

evenhandedly in theory. The current market conditions can only be
attributed to the FDL as a whole. If the Third Circuit had not analyzed

the individual provisions separately, it may have been easier and more
feasible to attribute the conditions of Pennsylvania's funeral home
market to the FDL. Because the Third Circuit decided to separate the
FDL's provisions, its inquiry into the FDL's effect on out-of-state
parties fell far short of what is demanded by the Commerce Clause.
B. The Third Circuit'sDeferentialStandard
The Supreme Court of the United States has made it unequivocally

clear that while the language of a law may not evince a discriminatory
purpose or effect, the law may still do so by its practical effect and

design. 14 1 However, different courts have applied varying degrees of
scrutiny and deference when deciding whether a law violates the
dormant Commerce Clause. 142 Some courts handling a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge are more critical of the arguments
advanced by the state in support of a law, and are more willing to draw

conclusions about legislative intent based on the extrinsic evidence
offered. 143 Examples of evidence that some circuit courts consider
include: (1) statements by lawmakers and decision makers; (2) the
sequence of events leading up to a law's passage; and (3) whether the
link between the state's purported goal and the means used to achieve
141. C & A Carbome v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994) (striking down a local
ordinance that required all solid waste generated in the town to pass through its waste recycling center
on the grounds that it increased the cost for out-of-state interests to dispose of their waste, deprived outof-staters access to the local market, and discriminated by allowing only the favored operators to process
waste in the town).
142. See Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 2006) (striking down a Nebraska farm law on the
grounds that, despite the law's non-discriminatory language, the goal of the law was to benefit Nebraska
farmers). See also Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014).
143. Smithfield Foods Inc. v. Miller, 367 F.3d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 2004) (courts look to indirect
and direct evidence to determine whether a state adopted a statute with a discriminatory purpose. This
evidence can include: (1) statements by lawmakers; (2) the sequence of events leading up to the statute's
adoption; (3) the state's consistent pattern of disparately impacting members of a particular class of
persons; (4) the statute's historical background; and (5) the statute's use of highly ineffective means to
promote the legitimate interest asserted by the state). See also Waste Mgmt. Holdings v. Gilmore, 252
F.3d 316, 336 (4th Cir. 2001) (listing the following factors as important: (1) evidence of a consistent
pattern of actions by the decision-making body disparately impacting members of a particular class; (2)
historical background of the decision, which may take into account any history of discrimination; (3)
specific sequence of events leading up to the act and; (4) contemporary statements by decision makers
on the record in minutes or in their meetings).
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that goal is tenable. 144 The consideration of these factors reflects a
standard that is less deferential to legislatures and one that heavily
scrutinizes the link between the state's articulated goal and the policy
itself. However, the Third Circuit in Heffner failed to consider these or
any other factors commonly considered by courts. 14 5 Unlike the District
Court, the Third Circuit placed very little weight on extrinsic evidence
that challenged the state's purported goal and indicated an underlying
discriminatory intent. 146 Additionally, the Third Circuit emphasized that
the FDL provisions are facially non-discriminatory with respect to instate residency and refused to draw an inference of discriminatory effect
or purpose from evidence highlighting an uncompetitive marketplace,
despite overwhelming evidence of the FDL's discriminatory effect. 147
Some courts have found that laws have a discriminatory purpose or
effect even though the language of the law in question is neutral with
respect to state residency. 1 In Jones v. Gale, for example, the Eighth
Circuit was faced with a voter-approved amendment to the Nebraska
Constitution. The amendment prohibited farming in Nebraska by
corporations and syndicates, but carved out an exception for "family
farm or ranch corporations" defined as corporations in which at least
one family member resided on or engaged in the daily operation of the
farm. 14 9 Despite acknowledging that the language of the law was

facially neutral with respect to state residency because the term
"engaged in the daily operation of a farm" applied to out-of-state
residents as well, the Eighth Circuit rejected the state's argument that
the voter-approved amendment did not favor Nebraska residents. 5 0 In
reaching its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit looked at the history leading
up to the amendment, which revealed that the state was encouraging

144. Smithfield Foods, 367 F.3d 1061; Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316.
145. See Heffner, 745 F.3d at 70-77.
146. Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 3d 358, 398 (M.D. Pa. 2012), ajfd in part, rev'd in part,
745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014). Heffner, 745 F.3d at 70-77.
147. Expert Report of David E. Harrington at 14-15, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir.
2014) (No. 12-3591) (citing studies which show that Pennsylvania's strict regulatory scheme decreases
the number of crematories, increases the number of small-independently owned funeral homes, and
drives up costs for consumers).
148. Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1267 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that an interstate commerce
claim is not precluded by the absence of an express prohibition on non-resident ownership or the fact
that in-state corporations will suffer some negative impact). See also Family Winemakers of Cal. v.
Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010) (striking down a Massachusetts law that established different
methods of distribution for "small" and "large" wineries on the grounds that, since most of the wineries
in the state were small, the law had a discriminatory effect and purpose, despite the fact that the law
only discriminated with respect to the size of wineries, and not with respect to in-state residency).
149. Jones, 470 F.3d 1261.
150. Id. 1267-70.
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voters to protect Nebraska farms by passing the amendment. 15 1 The
Court found that the state appropriately made the logical assumption that
most people who are engaged in the daily operation of a Nebraska farm
probably will be Nebraska residents. 152 According to the Eighth Circuit,
because the amendment's exception was for corporations in which "a
family member resides on or engages in work on Nebraska farm land,"
the language was a naked attempt to hide the discriminatory intent of the
law by substituting language that was neutral with respect to stateresidency. 153 The First Circuit also has found that a law can
discriminate in purpose and effect despite an absence of discriminatory
language. 154 In doing so, the First Circuit pointed to extrinsic evidence
showing that the law significantly benefitted in-state businesses at the
expense of out-of-state businesses. 155 It also noted that even without
that in-state businesses
examining the extrinsic evidence, it was 5clear
6
could maximize efficiency under the law. 1
The Third Circuit in Heffner focused primarily on the language of the
law, which should be the first step in a dormant Commerce Clause
analysis. However, the Third Circuit should have placed more weight
on other factors, such as the link between the state's articulated goal and
the FDL provisions; any relevant findings made by decision-making
bodies; and the broad economic impact of the law. When closely
scrutinizing the link between the state's goal and the FDL licensing
scheme, the Third Circuit had enough extrinsic evidence to reach its
own conclusions about that link without overstepping its bounds. Given
that the FDL makes exceptions for RBC's, it is clear that the state's
articulated goal of preventing monopolization is not being achieved by
the FDL. The exception carved out for RBC's effectively gives
directors licensed in Pennsylvania the unrestricted ability to expand their
operations.
The Third Circuit's continued insistence that the exception applies to
everyone equally might seem to neutralize this argument, but this is

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 9-15 (plaintiffs challenged a Massachusetts law that
allowed "small" wineries to distribute directly to consumers, but forced "large" wineries to either
purchase a direct shipping license or sell their wine through wholesalers. Almost all of the wineries in
Massachusetts, at the time, qualified as "small" wineries under the law. The court rejected the state's
argument that since the law treated all "small" wineries the same, its goal was to provide a competitive
advantage to all small wineries in the country.).
155. Id. at 11 (noting that after the first year the law was in effect, Massachusetts's wineries
distributed twenty-nine percent of their annual production through wholesalers and seventy-one percent
through direct shipping to consumers).
156. Id. at 11-12.
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where the Third Circuit erred in its analysis. Although the FDL is non-

discriminatory with respect to residency, it still treats in-state and outof-state economic interests differently by discriminating with respect to
licensure, because the FDL advances the interests of funeral homes
licensed in Pennsylvania. While licensure is not directly attached to
residency, there is a strong and substantiated connection between
Pennsylvania licensure and Pennsylvania residency. Also, Pennsylvania
licensed directors are practicing in the state, regardless of where they
live, indicating that the FDL's exceptions are directly benefiting
Pennsylvania businesses. The Third Circuit could have easily made this
connection, as the Supreme Court has never suggested that an in-state
interest must be predicated solely on in-state residency. 157
Under the FDL, an out-of-state party would have to comply with
Pennsylvania's licensure requirements just to be eligible for an RBC,
which can then be freely transferred upon procurement. 158 The one and
a branch restriction makes moving to Pennsylvania an unwritten
requirement for owning and operating funeral homes in the state, given
that operating only two establishments from out-of-state would not be
feasible. Because of this, the FDL licensing provisions are clearly
designed to give in-state parties an advantage. In Jones, the Eighth
Circuit recognized that the majority of people working on Nebraska
farms are Nebraska citizens. Similarly, the majority of licensed funeral
159
directors practicing in Pennsylvania are residents of the state.
Therefore, the majority of people benefiting from the licensing and
ownership restrictions are Pennsylvania residents with no out-of-state
competition. These ownership and licensing restrictions impose barriers
on out-of-state parties that limit their participation in the market without
advancing any legitimate goal. The existence of barriers that unduly

burden out-of-state parties is all that is needed for a dormant Commerce
Clause violation; a plaintiff does not need to prove that there is an
absolute prohibition on out-of-state business.160

The record was filled with evidence indicating that the FDL's purpose
has fallen out of line with the FDL's provisions. This conclusion is
further supported by the lack of changes made to the FDL's provisions
in the past fifty years despite a changing landscape. Aside from the
157. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias 469 U.S. 263, 269 (1984) (holding that the undisputed
motivation for the law in question was to aid Hawaiian industry).
158. See supraPart 11of this Casenote.
159. See Brief for John F. Givinish as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 4, Heffier v.
Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591) (pointing to reports finding that it is common for a
funeral director to reside in the funeral home with his family, and also noting that as a practical matter,
Pennsylvania funeral directors live in Pennsylvania with their families).
160. See Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1267 (8th Cir. 2006) (an interstate commerce claim is not
precluded by the absence of an express prohibition on non-resident ownership).
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BFD's own recognition that some of the policies were nonsensical and
unnecessary, 16 1 there was also the Audit Report finding that the industry
had become dominated by small, family-owned businesses and that
some of the provisions were no longer related to the FDL's initial
goal. 162 While the Audit Report is not direct evidence of legislative
intent at the time of the FDL's passage, it does prove that a decisionmaking body has concluded that something has gone awry with the
FDL. This evidence should have quelled any fears the Third Circuit had
about usurping legislative power, because it indicates that the legislature
also was questioning the FDL's efficacy and necessity in light of market
shifts and technological changes.
C. Economic Protectionismas a Legitimate State Interest
The Third Circuit's dormant Commerce Clause analysis cannot
escape the difficult question of whether protecting a local market is a
legitimate state interest, and, if so, how far the state may go in protecting
the local market. While this question may not be an explicit component
of the dormant Commerce Clause framework, 163 in many cases, it still
informs a court's ultimate decision on a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge. For example, the BFD in Heffner articulated three reasons
for the FDL's licensing restrictions and exceptions: (1) disfavoring
ownership of funeral homes by unlicensed individuals or corporations;
(2) advancing the public interest in the continued operation of a funeral
home after the licensee's death; and (3) alleviating the financial loss to
survivors who might find themselves in a precarious situation. 164 The
second and third reasons are tied to protection of a local market.
Although it may be argued that the third reason is aimed at protecting an
individual-namely, the estate or family member of a deceased funeral
director-the reason for granting them an exception under the law is to
ensure their continued participation in the market. When evaluating and
weighing these articulated interests, the Third Circuit found that they
were legitimate goals worth pursuing and proved that the state did not
run afoul of the limitations imposed by the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 16 5 Circuit courts are divided on whether local economic

161. Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358, 400 (M.D. Pa. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (alluding to the BFD's recognition that eliminating the requirement that
every facility have an embalming requirement makes sense and would "reduce costs without harming
the public.").
162. See Brief of Appellees at 5, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591).
163. See supra paragraph one of Part IV.
164. Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 74 (3d Cir. 2014).
165. Id. at 76.
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protection is a legitimate interest that can be articulated by a state for
purposes of a substantive due process analysis.' 66 However, the
Supreme Court has held that laws motivated purely by economic
protectionism face a "per se rule of invalidity" in the dormant
Commerce Clause context. 167 This comports with the general principle
that "preservation of a local industry by protecting it from the rigors of
interstate competition is the hallmark
of the economic protectionism that
1 68
the Commerce Clause prohibits."'
Labeling a state interest as protectionist may be difficult for courts,
because laws aimed at promoting legitimate interests, such as the health
and safety of the pubic, can incidentally provide advantages to certain
parties. This has the effect of blurring the line between legitimate and
illegitimate interests. Additionally, reasons articulated by the state in
support of certain policies usually have the effect of both providing an
advantage to parties or local markets and promoting a legitimate nondiscriminatory interest. This is why, as the Third Circuit in Heffner
noted, "virtually all state regulation involves increased costs for those
doing business within the state, including out-of-state interests doing
business in the state," and, in this sense, "virtually all state regulation
burdens interstate commerce." 169 Nevertheless, the purpose of the
Commerce Clause seems antithetical to pure economic protectionism
that: (1) does more than just promote the safety and health of the market
as a whole and (2) has the effect of giving a certain group of parties an
advantage over another group of parties participating in the same local
markets.
As the goal of propping up a family funeral director
constitutes this type of pure economic protectionism, the Third Circuit
should have excluded this reason from the analysis altogether.
The FDL's provisions supposedly are aimed at doing more than
protecting the local market, because the state's justifications were
predicated on advancing the health and safety of the industry. The Third
Circuit should have scrutinized those justifications, but, instead, the
court awarded excessive deference to the state. Given that many of the
FDL provisions have fallen out of line with evolving health and safety
practices, 170 and that many of the exceptions had little, if anything, to do
166. See supraPart HIon circuit court split.

167. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 339
(2007) (county's flow control ordinances did not violate the Commerce Clause because they treated all
private companies the same and benefited a public facility). See also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978) (New Jersey statute prohibiting the importation of most solid or liquid waste which
originated or was collected outside of the state violates the dormant Commerce Clause because it erects
a barrier against interstate commerce).
168. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 205 (1994).
169. Heffher v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 74 (3d Cir. 2014).
170. Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358, 398 (M.D. Pa. 2012), affid in part, rev'd in part,
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with health and safety, 17 1 there was plenty of room to criticize and
rebuff the state's assertions. The Third Circuit had enough evidence at
its disposal to conclude that the licensing and
ownership restrictions did
72
1
market.
local
the
promote
than
little more
D. The FDL is Bad Economic Practice
There is myriad evidence questioning the benefits of licensing
schemes in general. 173 The amount and degree of harm that strict
licensing inflicts on consumers and markets varies by study, but the
growing consensus is that the harms caused by licensing outweigh any
potential benefits. 174 The funeral home industry is greatly affected by
strict licensing schemes. 175 Pennsylvania's licensing scheme has a
negative impact on consumers by driving up prices and protecting
traditional funeral establishments. 6 Studies show that the high barriers
to entry and prohibition on corporate ownership without a pre-1935
license ensure that a high number of small, family-owned funeral homes
will continue to dominate the market. 177 Many of these funeral homes
handle a small number of funerals per year, and, consequently, cannot
exploit economies of scale. 78 The FDL's provisions protect these small
funeral homes by making it impossible to own more than two locations
associated with an ownership interest and limiting the number of
745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that the FDL's requirement that every facility must have a full-time
supervisor is, by the BFD's own recognition, outdated and makes little sense).
171. See Brief of Appellees at 3, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d. Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591)
(alluding to the 1994 Audit Report, which found that the FDL, in light of advances in mortuary science,
has little to do with health and safety).
172. Heffner, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 383-90 (this evidence included reports showing the cost of
obtaining licensure and the cost of obtaining a pre-1935 license, economic studies quantifying the
detrimental impact on out-of-state parties, the BFD's own admission that some of the regulations are
unnecessary, and studies showing that the funeral market in Pennsylvania is saturated with Pennsylvania
businesses).
173. See supraPart 11of this Casenote.
174. See id.
175. Expert Report of David Harrington at 13, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014)
(No. 12-3591).
176. Brief of Appellees at 39, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591)
(referencing the 1994 Audit Report and noting that the one and a branch provision, coupled with the
FDL requirement that every facility have an embalming room, results in added costs for funeral
directors and leads to higher costs for consumers). Expert Report of David Harrington at 3, Heffier v.
Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3591) (discussing findings that the Pennsylvania's funeral
home regulations increase the cost of funerals to consumers by, on average, $550 per funeral).
177. See Expert Report of David Harrington at 13, Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014)
(No. 12-3591) (noting that according to U.S. census data, Pennsylvania ranks second in the U.S. with
2,146 total establishments, only slightly behind New York's 2,150. If Pennsylvania had the same
number of funeral homes per capita as the rest of the country, it would have only 1,144 funeral homes).
178. See id.
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corporations that can enter into the market. 179 While this may benefit
small funeral home owners, it drives up the costs of funeral services and
funeral products for Pennsylvania residents and drastically reduces the
number of places offering low-cost cremation services. 18
In its
decision, the Third Circuit dismissed most of this data on the grounds
that it failed to show a discriminatory impact or purpose. However,
other courts have considered the impact that a law had on economic
markets and the extent to which legislators were aware of such an
impact.' 8 1 In Heffner, the only economic data available showed that the
FDL was
having a negative impact on consumers and the industry as a
182
whole.

While the FDL is bad economic practice, new competitors may not be
able to restore competitive balance by utilizing the political process.
The inability of new competitors to change the FDL exacerbates its
negative economic impact by perpetuating the status quo. The FDL is a
perfect example of what happens when regulatory bodies entrusted to
protect markets are only concerned with advancing their own
interests. 18 3 Not surprisingly, these regulatory bodies exert tremendous

lobbying power, which places new competitors at a serious
disadvantage. Aside from hostile regulatory bodies, another problem is
the overwhelming amount of laws in general, making it difficult and
impractical for legislatures to change and monitor them all. 184 This
presents another obstacle for new competitors seeking to engender
competitive balance in the funeral home market. Due to the sheer
volume of laws, acknowledgments from within the legislature or
regulatory boards that certain laws need to be modified might not
materialize in an actual change to the law. In sum, the cards are stacked
against out-of-state funeral homes looking to break into the market. The
inability of these newcomers to utilize the political process in order to
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 161 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding a Texas law
regulating insurance and pointing to the legislative record, which revealed that legislators heard
extensive testimony from witnesses on the legitimate consumer protection concerns sought to be
remedied by the bill and testimony on how the law would affect insurance rates).
182. See Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358, 383-389 (M.D. Pa. 2012), aff'd in part,rev'din
part, 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014).
183. DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN AMERICA (1987) (as
one commentator put it, "the benefits of licensing are heavily concentrated in current practitioners and
the liabilities are dispersed among potential newcomers, so those that are currently licensed have a much
stronger incentive to lobby for stricter licensing laws.").
184. See Edward J. Imwinkehied, A More Modest Proposalthan a Common Law for the Age of
Statutes: GreaterReliance in Statutory Interpretationon the Concept of Interpretive Intention, 68 ALB.
L. REV. 949 (2005) (noting that the sheer number of statutes makes it hard for legislatures to monitor
them).
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change the FDL further supports a rejection of the Third Circuit's more
deferential approach in Heffner.
E. Future Trends

The lawsuit brought in Heffner was unique in the sense that it
presented a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a funeral home
regulatory scheme. The dormant Commerce Clause challenge was
warranted because, unlike other funeral home regulatory schemes, the
FDL had a measurable impact on out-of-state parties and any potential
newcomers to the market. After the Third Circuit upheld the FDL's
controversial provisions by employing a relaxed standard of scrutiny,
governments and licensing boards seeking to insulate local practitioners
from out-of-state competition will see the ruling as a green light to either
advance legislation or maintain a status quo that imposes high barriers to
entry for out-of-state parties. In lieu of the current trend, which is
moving towards stricter licensing restrictions, the Heffner holding sets a
precedent that limits the ability of courts to strike down laws and
regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause. Heffner confines the
reach of judicial scrutiny when courts are dealing with laws that are
facially neutral with respect to state residency. If courts choose to
follow the Heffner precedent, protectionist laws passed under the guise
of promoting the health and safety of the industry will be immune from
Commerce Clause scrutiny as long as those laws are facially neutral.
Ultimately, this ruling raises questions about the dormant Commerce
Clause as a tool to strike down laws that have a negative impact on outof-state parties.
V. CONCLUSION

In Heffner v. Murphy, Pennsylvania's controversial Funeral
Director's Law, which governs Pennsylvania's funeral home industry,
was challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause. This challenge
was set against the backdrop of a growing licensing problem, not only in
the funeral home industry, but in many professional industries. Two of
the controversial regulations at issue govern who can own a funeral
home in Pennsylvania and place limitations on how many
establishments can be owned. The Third Circuit ultimately upheld these
two provisions, and, in doing so, rejected a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge brought by the plaintiffs. When analyzing these provisions
under the dormant Commerce Clause, the Third Circuit employed a
relaxed standard of scrutiny by focusing primarily on the neutral
language of the FDL. This Casenote advocates that courts should
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employ a more stringent standard of scrutiny when analyzing a law
under the dormant Commerce Clause. This standard, adopted by other
courts, does not foreclose a finding that the dormant Commerce Clause
has been violated after a finding that a law contains neutral language. It
also places more weight on extrinsic evidence and forces courts to
closely examine the link between a state's articulated rationale and the
broader impact that a law is having. The dormant Commerce Clause
reflects the idea that it is in the best interest of the country to repudiate
policies that protect local markets; instead, it suggests that policies that
promote a market without rigid state barriers is superior to
protectionism. By easing the burden placed on licensing boards to
justify the regulations they promulgate, the Third Circuit has made it
harder for plaintiffs seeking to cultivate a competitive market to
challenge these types of laws under the dormant Commerce Clause. As
licensing boards continue to perpetuate a harmful status quo, people will
continue to explore new avenues for recourse. A more stringent
standard ofjudicial scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause would
serve as an effective tool to combat this growing problem.
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